Talk:Moral objectivism

History

This page was voted on for deletion at Wikipedia:Votes for deletion/Objective morality. dbenbenn | talk 23:12, 24 Mar 2005 (UTC)

This article is going to need a lot of work - so, for now, I'm just serving notice of my intention. Among other things, I find it surprising that a marginal figure to moral philosophy like Ayn Rand gets mentioned in the lead, while there is little if any focus on the most important thinker who argued for an objectively binding morality, namely Kant. Metamagician3000 03:58, 23 December 2006 (UTC)

I guess it's an association that people have with Objectivism. To be honest, I have never heard of Kant being mentioned in the same sentence as objectivism, but Ayn Rand certainly is. Article certainly needs a lot of work, but I don't agree that it should be deleted. By the same token, wikipedia shouldn't be solely an homage to pop culture. Editorcomm (talk) 00:45, 5 May 2008 (UTC)

Biology

I read the moral objectivism and moral relativism article, but I did not find that either position accomodated the notion that moral judgments are rooted in human nature, by which I mean biological fact, and that this is probably a nessesary part of the evolution of organisms that form societies of autonomous individuals.

Thus, helping people is "good" in much the same way that soap "tastes disagreeable". It's rooted in the kind of animals we are.

So, to what article does the position that morals are neither objective in the sense of being unrelated to human experience, nor subjective in the sense of being different from person to person, belong? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Paul Murray (talk • contribs) 04:06, 16 January 2007 (UTC).

Try moral relativism. 1Z 09:58, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

No, moral relativism is essentially opposed to such a view (morality can't be relative to culture if it's rooted in our nature as human beings). Objectivism says something like this, but not in crude social-Drawinism terms (which essentially explaine morality away rather than explaining it). When I've had a chance to expand this article properly, it should bring this all out. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 23:28, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

Merging Moral realism here

As Canuck-Errant and Metamagician3000 have pointed out, Moral realism covers precisely the same topic as this article. If "moral realism" is in fact distinct from "moral objectivism", I don't see any indication of that in either article, so I think they should be merged. — Elembis (talk) 03:04, 7 March 2007 (UTC)

Moral objectivism is sometimes called moderate realism, so it might make sense to merge -- but there is so much to say about each position that separate articles would be a more realistic option. --163.1.43.125 13:59, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

Moral objectivism is the epistemological claim that ethical statements have mind-independent truth-values. Moral realism is one way of explaining that claim: by making the further, metaphysical, claim that moral facts or moral values really exist. 1Z 15:55, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

That's not the way the terms are used in the literature. The anon is right to say that objectivism is often called moderate realism; it developed in part as a result of the response to attacks on realism by writers like Mackie. McDowell explicitly makes this point in his development of the thesis, pointing out that Mackie's arguments from queerness assume that realism must be "extreme" (treating moral values as like primary qualities), but realism can be "moderate" (objectivism — treating moral values as like secondary qualities). I think that merging the two articles would be a mistake. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 22:18, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

Agreed. The quote given from Richard Boyd is particularly misleading, as well, as he is a moral naturalist which a) is only one type of moral realism and b) is quite distinct from McDowell's theory, to the point of having barely anything in common with it - particularly since McDowell openly despises "scientism". I'm not even sure why that's on there, unless someone's confused enough to be conflating Cornell Realism and moral objectivism. In any case, moral objectivism is a sub-class of moral realism, not the other way around, so if any merging is to be done it should be moral objectivism into moral realism. 129.234.4.76 14:03, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

What name would you give to the claim that moral propositions have mind-independent truth values, but that moral values don't exist at all, primarily , secondarily, naturally, or whatever? (cf mathematical formalism) 1Z 15:49, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

You'd have to tell me what would allow moral propositions to have mind-independent truth values if there were no such thing as moral values in order for me to answer that - i.e., what is it by reference to that makes them true or false? There's quite a few different options, so being specific would help narrow things down a bit. Unless your point is that moral propositions have mind-independent truth values without reference to anything, in which case I'd say Mackie's error theory is the closest to that - although don't quote me on it, since it's been a while since I've looked at anything of Mackie's other than his queerness arguments. Certain forms of expressivism might come close, as well - possibly Blackburn's quasi-realism. 129.234.4.76 16:19, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

"You'd have to tell me what would allow moral propositions to have mind-independent truth values if there were no such thing as moral values in order for me to answer that - i.e., what is it by reference to that makes them true or false?" -- I don't see why. It is not usually necessary to fully defend a claim in order to put a label on it. Arguably , no claim has been been fully defended, although many have been labelled. 1Z 16:44, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

I'm not entirely sure what your point is. I asked for clarification because I need it; the answer to your question will be entirely different dependent upon whether the referent of the moral propositions actually exists or not. If it actually exists, then I would need further clarification because dependent on the referent, the theory may be realist or anti-realist, and the specifics of that clarification would allow me to name a type within those categories. If there is no referent, then, as I said, either Mackie or Blackburn - so either error theory or quasi-realism - would be closest to what you've said. I cannot answer your question until you give me the information I need, because the lack of information means that it could go almost anywhere. You're asking me to name the species of something you've only described as an animal. 129.234.4.76 17:14, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

The claim that moral propositions have truth values is obviously not an error theory, and the claim that they do not refer at all is hardly realism. Blackburn may feel that they need to function as if they do but not all people-who-believe-moral-propositions-have-mind-independent-truth-values (I cannot yet use the convenient term "moral objectivists") need agree. 1Z 20:10, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

Same anon here, different IP. I'm afraid you're betraying your ignorance of the topics you're arguing about here: "The claim that moral propositions have truth values is obviously not an error theory" being a prime example, because it's wrong. Mackie's error theory is that moral propositions *do* have truth values, but that they're all false. Your summary of Blackburn is an oversimplification, as well, but that's not much of a problem seeing as Blackburn is difficult to fully understand, and that simplification is as accurate as a simplification can be, despite your apparent misconception of what quasi-realism is. The "quasi" is important. From your overall comments, it would appear that you're arguing for your own theory (or your own idea of a theory) and not attempting to learn about the actual academic classifications currently extant, and thus Wikipedia is not the place for this discussion. If you want to learn more about these topics, I would suggest the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy as a good starting place, in particular - given the context here - the articles on Moral Naturalism, Moral Non-Naturalism, and Moral Realism. The references in those articles should provide sufficient further reading to enlighten you of the information you are missing. At that point, I will be glad to reopen this discussion, should you feel willing. 81.76.88.183 20:51, 7 May 2007 (UTC)

The article was a bit of a mess; it had been expanded to include the completely irrelevant topic of Ayn Rand (a totally different use of the term "objectivism"), and the relevant but different notion of moral realism. I'll work on it further tomorrow. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 22:05, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

The debate has lead some?

This basically says a debate has lead some into a philosophy neither side of the debate favors ... I'd like to see a source for that. I mean, it's like "Says who?" It can be (and sometimes is) argued that all moral relativists choose that philosophy for entirely unrelated reasons. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.243.242.58 (talk) 19:46, 31 May 2008 (UTC)

Realism and Objectivism

Hi all. I'm attempting to clean up and organize meta-ethics articles here on wikipedia. I've recently reorganized the meta-ethics article itself, based on information already there and discussions that were happening on the talk pages. The way we have it organized now, moral realism is classified as a form of moral objectivism; the latter taken to be the claim that moral propositions assert facts about mind-independent features of the world, and the former making the additional claim that some such assertions are in fact true (in contrast to error theory which is classified as a form of moral objectivism which holds all such assertions to be false).

However, I come here and see objectivism being labelled as a form of realism instead! Completely the reverse of what the people at Talk:Meta-ethics were saying, although some people here (in the merger thread above) seem to be making the same point.

Can someone here please cite a definitive source (or multiple if possible) clarifying the relationship between moral realism and moral objectivism; and if they are not as they are currently listed on the meta-ethics article, then what is the proper name for the category of theories which encompasses both moral realism and error theory?

Thanks. -Pfhorrest (talk) 06:13, 2 October 2008 (UTC)

It occurs to me now that we may have Error Theory miscategorized, in which case the above becomes a non-issue as Moral Objectivism and Moral Realism would be coextensive. Currently Error Theory is categorized as a sub-form of Objectivism; however, it's not clear to me, just from the info here on wiki, that Error Theory isn't rather a sub-form of Cognitivism simpliciter, in which case all non-error forms of cognitivism are forms of either realism or subjectivism.

I'm about to ask over at error theory whether that is the case. If it is, I propose that this article be made to redirect to moral realism. Although, there also appears (again, just from the info on wiki here) to be a sense of "objectivism" which is merely synonymous with "universalism" - that is, claiming that some form of morality is objectively, universally correct, without making any semantic claims that would entail cognitivism. In that case, it may be best if this article be made to disambiguate between objectivism-as-in-realism, and objectivism-as-in-universalism. (This could also solve the Randian conflict; just add Randian 'Objectivist' ethics as another disambiguation link in the list). Although, there may be a further issue in that there appears to be a "minimalist" sense of moral realism which is again synonymous with universalism, without the cognitivist semantic claim.

-Pfhorrest (talk) 20:32, 3 October 2008 (UTC)

This question is now part of a larger project I am undertaking, regarding disambiguating the terms moral realism, moral objectivism, moral universalism, moral absolutism, and moral relativism. I have started a discussion about this at Talk:Meta-ethics#More_extensive_reorganization; please come by and contribute your thoughts there. -Pfhorrest (talk) 22:56, 4 October 2008 (UTC)

Moved from article page

I've just removed the following two paragraphs from the article: the former seems a better fit for moral universalism, as it obliquely references universalist forms of ethical subjectivism such as divine command theory (and I'm about to see if it can be adapted for that article in a moment); the latter, as far as I can tell, is just original research.

Models of objective morality may be atheistic, deistic (in the case of Enlightenment philosophers), monotheistic (in the case of the Abrahamic religions), or polytheistic (in the case of Hinduism). The moral codes may stem from reason, from the divine, or from a combination of the two. These various systems differ on the meta-ethical question of the nature of the objective morality, but agree on its existence. It is this diversity between existing codes of objective morality, and the continued debates over the meta-ethical justification of morality, that lead some to reject the concept entirely, in favour of ethical subjectivism or other forms of moral relativism.

Advocates of objective morality have proposed a number of means to bridge the gap between the objective and subjective. Others dismiss the need to do so altogether due to the allowance of objectivity from relativistic opposition.

-Pfhorrest (talk) 06:43, 2 October 2008 (UTC)

I'm also moving the following passage to the moral realism page:

According to Richard Boyd, moral realism means that:

1. Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false, etc.);
2. The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.;
3. Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge.

-Pfhorrest (talk) 03:32, 3 October 2008 (UTC)